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ABSTRACT
We show that demand uncertainty leads to vertical product differentiation even when consumers are
homogeneous. When a firm anticipates that its inventory or capacity may not be fully utilized,
product variety can reduce its expected costs of excess capacity. When the firm offers a continuum
of product varieties, the highest quality product has the highest profit margins but the lowest
percentage margin, while the lowest quality product has the highest percentage margin but the
lowest absolute margin. We derive these results in both a monopoly model and a variety of different
competitive models.  We conclude with a discussion of empirical predictions together with a brief
discussion of supporting evidence available from marketing studies.
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What determines the breadth of a firm’s product line?  While prior research on 
product line, and product variety more generally, focuses on heterogeneity in consumers’ 
preferences or income, we show that when firms supply an uncertain number of 
consumers, they may offer more than one product even when consumers preferences are 
homogeneous. Offering multiple products reduces the costs associated with uncertain 
demand. In particular, firms prefer to use lower quality products to meet speculative 
demand. In other words, firms limit their inventory of high quality goods and sell low 
quality goods once their high quality goods have stocked out.  Our model helps explain 
the extent of product differentiation and suggests a rationale for many common retailing 
practices such as the use of private labels and full product line forcing by manufacturers. 
Specific retail examples include grocery stores’ offerings of national brands and 
private labels, their offerings of fresh and frozen meats and seafood, and restaurants’ 
offerings of special entrees in addition to the regular dinner menu. The model also helps 
to understand how toy retailers decide how many high versus low quality toys to stock 
and how clothing retailers decide how many designer fashion items versus regular items 
to stock. 
The model can also explain product differentiation in travel and other service 
industries. For example, airlines must decide how many first class, business, and extra 
deep coach class seats to put in a passenger airplane.  And hotels can be designed so that 
every room had a view (a long, narrow design) or so that some rooms have views and 
others don’t (by using a wider design): rooms with views clearly cost more given the 
shadow (land) cost of the scarce view (i.e., the water can only be viewed from exterior 
rooms on the side of the building facing it). 
 Stadiums can be built with permanent seats 
(more comfortable) and temporary seats (less comfortable). Similarly, universities must 
decide how many faculty versus Ph.D. students to use in staffing their undergraduate   2
classes, and medical centers must decide how many physician’s aids versus doctor’s to 
use in a doctor’s office that accepts walk-in patients. 
The common elements in these examples are that firms sink costs of production 
before demand is realized and that firms choose their capacity (or inventory) of high and 
low quality products with the expectation that the high quality products will be consumed 
more frequently than low quality products. 
The economics and marketing literatures have made big steps in understanding 
product differentiation, but have exclusively focused on consumer heterogeneity as the 
reason for variety (see surveys by Eaton and Lipsey, 1989, and Lancaster, 1990).  An 
important part of this literature looks at the product line and pricing decisions of a 
monopolist engaging in second degree price discrimination when consumers’ valuations 
are correlated with their preference for product quality (see Muss and Rosen, 1978, and 
the empirical work of Sheperd, 1991).   
Our work is also related to the literature in operations management literature on 
the inventory problem for a multi-product firm when consumers substitute products in 
response to stockouts (see Mahajan and van Ryzin, 2001, Bassok, Anupindi, and Akella, 
1999, and Noonan, 1995). However, this literature has treated the firm’s product line as 
exogenous. A paper by van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) considers a model of optimal 
product assortment with stockouts, but they assume stockouts result in lost sales rather 
than substitution (see also a related paper by Smith and Agrawal, 2000). 
In our paper, we show that even when all consumers have the same preferences 
over product quality, firms may still offer multiple product qualities provided that 
demand is uncertain.  When only two products are feasible, we show that necessary and 
sufficient conditions for both products to be produced are that demand is uncertain, that 
the high quality product generates greater absolute consumer surplus and profit, and that 
the lower quality product generates greater relative surplus and percentage margins.  In 
the next section we show this result when there is a monopoly supplier, and in Section 3   3
we show it for a competitive market and a social planner. In Section 4 we generalize the 
two-product model in Sections 2 and 3 by considering heterogeneous consumer 
valuations. In Section 5 we characterize the optimal product line for a monopolist when a 
continuum of products are feasible. This extension helps establish the generality of the 
results in the two-product model.  We show that the highest quality product produced is 
the one that generates the greatest total surplus (the one that would have been produced if 
demand were certain) and the lowest quality product produced is the one that maximizes 
the relative, or percentage surplus.  Section 6 concludes with a discussion of empirical 
implications together with a brief discussion of supporting evidence from marketing 
studies of margins earned by grocery stores on private label and national brands.  Section 
6 also discusses the implications of our model for manufacturer-retailer relationships and 
full-line forcing, one of several important areas for future research.  
2. Monopolist with Two Feasible Product Varieties 
The Model 
In this section we analyze the product line, inventory, and pricing decisions of a 
monopolist that can produce two vertically differentiated varieties of the same product, a 
high quality product and a low quality product.  
Let  fx ()  denote the probability distribution function associated with the random 
variable x, the number of identical consumers willing to buy one unit of output (one seat), 
on the support  x,x  [] ⊂ℜ
+ and suppose x >0.  Let Fx ()  denote the associated 
cumulative distribution function. 
Each consumer is willing to pay vh for the high quality good and vl for the low 
quality good.  Without loss of generality, we assume vh > vl.   
The high quality good costs ch per unit to produce whether or not it is sold.  The 
low quality good costs cl per unit to produce whether or not it is sold.  We assume that   4
vh > ch, vl > cl, and ch > cl, since otherwise the product choice problem would be trivial.  
We normalize the non-sunk costs to zero. 
Define ∆ h = vh − ch and ∆ l = vl − cl to be the total or absolute surplus created by 
the high and low quality product respectively and define ω h = vh − ch () vh and 
ω l = vl − cl () vl to be the percentage or relative surplus created by each product. 
This is a model of complete information and we assume throughout that 
consumers maximize their surplus given the set of available products and prices.  
The One-Product Case 
Suppose first that the firm is constrained to produce only the high quality good (or 
by analogy, only the low quality good).  Clearly the firm sets  ph = vh .  Given this price, 
the firm chooses its inventory, qh, to maximize 
max
qh
vhxf x () dx
x
qh ∫ + vhqh fx () dx
qh
∞
∫ − qhch. 
The first term represents the firm’s revenue when realized demand is less than the 
firm’s inventory; the second term represents the firm’s revenue when demand exceeds the 
firm’s inventory and it stocks out, and the final term represents that ex ante sunk cost of 
production. 
The first order condition is 
vh 1− Fq h () [] − ch = 0.  
This is the well-known newsboy condition.  The firm chooses its inventory level to 
equate the marginal expected revenue of an additional unit of inventory with the marginal 
cost of inventory. Rearranging this, we can define the firm’s optimal inventory as the 
solution to  
1− Fq h
* () [] =
ch
vh
.    5
The Two-Product Case 
Now suppose that the monopolist can produce any amount of both the high 
quality good and the low quality good and that consumers are free to purchase any of the 
firm’s products that are available when it is their turn to buy.  The firm chooses the price 
and inventory of each product to maximize its expect profit. Note that the one-product 
solution above is feasible but not necessarily optimal. 
The firm’s problem is easiest to analyze by first solving the pricing decision.  The 
following lemma shows that in equilibrium, given any positive inventory choices, 
ph = vh  and  pl = vl.  This is intuitive since we expect the firm to extract the entire 
surplus. While these prices are not optimal for all possible consumer behavior, they are 
optimal when consumers buy all of the firms’ high quality goods before buying any low 
quality goods, and we show that this always happens in equilibrium.  
Lemma: In equilibrium, given any positive inventory choices, the monopolist’s prices 
are  ph = vh  and  pl = vl and consumers buy all of the firms’ high quality goods before 
buying any low quality goods. 
Proof: If consumers strictly prefer either good, the firm can increase the price of 
that good without changing the order of purchase and its profits would increase, 
so consumers must be indifferent between the goods.  
Since they are indifferent, consumers must buy the high quality goods 
first. Otherwise the firm could increase its profits by lowering the price of high 
quality goods (since high quality goods have a higher price and the costs are 
sunk).  But if consumers buy low quality goods last, it follows that  pl = vl; 
otherwise the firm could raise its profits by increasing pl. Since consumers are 
indifferent between the goods, it follows that  ph = vh .  
   6
  The certain demand case is presented as a benchmark. 
Proposition 1:  When demand is certain, i.e.  x = x , the monopolist produces only high 
quality goods if vh − ch > vl − cl (or ∆ h >∆ l) and only low quality goods if 
vh − ch < vl − cl(or ∆ h <∆ l). 
Proof: If demand is certain, the firm’s inventory decision solves   
max
ql ,qh {} vhqh + vlql − qhch − qlcl 
subject to qh + ql ≤ x, and qh,ql ≥ 0, which implies only the higher margin 
product will be produced. 
When demand is certain and vh − ch = vl − cl (or ∆ h =∆ l), the firm is indifferent 
between producing low quality and high quality goods. 
When demand is uncertain, we can use the Lemma, to write the monopolist’s 
inventory choice problem as 
max
ql ,qh {}
vhxf x () dx
x
qh ∫ + vhqh + vl x − qh () [] fx () dx
qh
qh +ql ∫ +




− qhch − qlcl
 (P) 
subject to qh ≥ 0 and ql ≥ 0.  So the optimal inventories are given by the complementary 
slackness conditions, 
vl 1− Fq h + ql () [] − cl ≤ 0, ql ≥ 0 (a) 
and 
vh 1− Fq h () [] − vl Fq h + ql () − Fq h () [] − ch ≤ 0, qh ≥ 0,   (b) 
where at most one inequality can hold with strict inequality in each condition.   7
From these optimality conditions we show the following results on the firm’s 
product line decision: 
Proposition 2: When demand is uncertain, i.e.,  x > x , then the monopolist produces (i) 
only the low quality good if vh − ch < vl − cl (or ∆ h <∆ l), (ii) both the high quality good 






















(or ω h >ω l). 
Proof. First, let vl − cl > vh − ch. If qh > 0, then either ql = 0 and qh > 0 or ql > 0 
and qh > 0. Suppose ql = 0 and qh > 0.  Then (a) and (b) become 
vl 1− Fq h () [] − cl ≤ 0and vh 1− Fq h () [] − ch = 0, which is a contradiction.  Suppose 
instead that ql > 0 and qh > 0. Then (a) and (b) hold with equality.  Subtracting 
(a) from (b) yields vh − vl [] 1− Fq h () [] = ch − cl, so 




or equivalentlyFq h () < 0, which is a contradiction.   So vl − cl > vh − ch implies 
qh = 0.  This implies the following complementary slackness condition 
1− Fq l () [] ≤
cl
vl
,ql ≥ 0, 
and since cl vl <1, it follows that so ql > 0. So qh = 0 and ql > 0.  
Next let vh − ch > vl − cl. If qh = 0, then either ql = 0 and qh = 0 or ql > 0 
and qh = 0. Suppose that ql = 0 and qh = 0. Then (a) and (b) imply vl − cl ≤ 0 and   8
vh − ch ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. Suppose instead ql > 0 and qh = 0.  Then (a) 
and (b) become vl 1− Fq l () [] − cl =0and vh − vlFq h () − ch ≤ 0, which is a 
contradiction. So vh − ch > vl − cl implies qh > 0. 














If ql > 0, then (a) and (b) can be rewritten as  
vl 1− Fq h + ql () [] − cl = 0 
and 




but these and (e) imply 






≥ 1− Fq h () []  







imply qh > 0 and ql = 0.   














If ql = 0, then (a) and (b) can be rewritten as  
vl 1− Fq h + ql () [] − cl ≤ 0 
and 




but these and (f) imply 






= 1− Fq h () [] , 






imply qh > 0 and ql = 0.   
If vl − cl = vh − ch the firm is indifferent between offering only the low quality 







then the firm is indifferent between offering only the high quality good and both the high 
and low quality goods.  Both of these equalities hold only in the case in which vl = cl and 
vh = ch, in which case there is no surplus and the firm is indifferent between producing 
either good and producing nothing. 
Figures 1 and 2 shows the optimal product line as a function of the costs of each 
product holding consumers’ valuations for the products fixed (we could have presented 
similar figures holding cost fixed and varying the valuations). Figure 1 shows graphically 
that when demand is certain, the decision to produce the high quality good versus the low   10
quality good depends only on the relative magnitude absolute markups, ∆ h = vh − ch and 
∆ l = vl − cl. The shaded regions are irrelevant for our analysis in that these are parameter 
values which violate our starting assumptions for the problem (we assumed that the low 
quality good was cheaper to produce and both goods could profitable be produced).  
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Figure 1: Product Line as a Function of Product Costs (Certain Demand) 
Figure 2 shows graphically that when demand is uncertain, the decision to 
produce the high quality good versus the low quality good depends both on which 
product has the higher total or absolute markups, ∆ h = vh − ch and ∆ l = vl − cl, and on 
which product has the higher relative or percentage markups, ω h =1− ch vh and 
ω l =1− cl vl .  If low quality goods have a higher absolute and percentage markup they 
are the only goods produced. Similarly, if high quality goods have a higher absolute and   11
percentage markup they are the only goods produced.  But when the high quality good 
has a greater absolute margin and the low quality good has a higher percentage margin, 
then both products are produced. 
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∆ h =∆ l 
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Figure 2: Product Line as a Function of Product Costs (Uncertain Demand) 
  Figure 3 provides the intuition for Proposition 2.  For the case in which it is 
optimal to produce both products, the Figure depicts the optimal production, qh
** and ql
** 
in terms of the first order conditions for the single product firm.  First notice that if the 
firm were to produce qh
* units of the high quality good and no units of the low quality 
good. the marginal return to adding a low quality unit the same as the marginal return to 
adding a low quality unit if the firm were to produce qh
* units of the low quality good, and 
this is clearly positive.  So the firm’s optimal total output is clearly defined by   12
vl 1− Fq () [] − cl = 0 and clearly exceeds qh
*. Second, notice that if only the high quality 
product were produced, the optimal choice of output, qh
*, exceeds qh
**.  The reason 
qh
** < qh
* is that when the firm is producing both products, an extra unit of the high quality 
output imposes an additional cost on the firm because it lowers the expected sales of the 







vl 1− Fq () [] − cl =0
vh 1− Fq () [] − ch =0
 
Figure 3: Graphs of the First Order Conditions from Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 implies the following interesting and empirically testable corollary 
about product lines.   
Corollary: If the monopolist produces two products then the higher quality product must 
have a higher absolute margin and lower percentage margin: qh > 0 and ql > 0 
⇒ ph − ch > pl − cl &  ph − ch () ph < pl − cl () pl.  
3. Competitive Markets with Two Product Varieties 
In this section we again suppose that firms can produce only two vertically 
differentiated varieties of the same product model, but here we allow a continuum of   13
competitive firms to supply the market. The same two products are feasible and the unit 
costs and consumer valuations are the same as in the monopoly analysis.  
There are a number of different ways to model competition with demand 
uncertainty, each of which is realistic for some markets and each of which can imply very 
different understandings of how market operate.  We examine three different models of 
competition and show that results similar to those in the previous models apply to all 
three models.  In Section 3.1 we assume that prices clear the market after demand is 
realized.  In Section 3.2 we assume that prices are set before demand is realized and that 
consumers can search costlessly for price and availability.  In Section 3.3 we also assume 
that prices are set before demand is realized, but assume that consumers can visit only 
one firm (but choose the firm to visit based on price and availability). 
The market allocations in the three competitive models turn out to be the same. 
This isn’t that surprising since in all three competitive models the choice of product 
variety is efficient (though this is a consequence of assuming homogeneous consumers 
and unit demands, see Dana, 1998, and Eden, working paper).  Under these conditions, 
the three competitive equilibrium allocations are also the same as in the monopoly 
problem above. We relax the unit demand assumption in Section 4. 
The following propositions, analogous to Propositions 1 and 2, hold for all three 
models. 
Proposition 3:  When demand is certain, i.e.  x = x , then in equilibrium competitive firms 
produce only high quality goods if vh − ch > vl − cl and only low quality goods if 
vh − ch < vl − cl. 
Proposition 3 follows from marginal cost pricing.   14
Proposition 4: When demand is uncertain, i.e.,  x < x , then competitive firms produce (i) 
only the low quality good if vl − cl > vh − ch; (ii) both the high quality good and the low 














In each case, though the definition of competitive equilibrium changes slightly, 
we show that conditions (a) and (b) hold. Proposition 4 (the proof is the same as 
Proposition 2) follows from (a) and (b).   
Finally, since Figure 1 follows from (a) and (b), it also depicts the equilibrium 
product line offerings in a competitive market. 
3.1 Market Clearing 
We begin with a definition of a competitive equilibrium. 
A competitive equilibrium is the ex ante levels of market production, qh and ql, 
a set of state-contingent spot market prices,  ph x ()  and  pl x ()  and spot market sales such 
that (i) firms sell in the spot market no more than they produce ex ante, (ii) if the spot 
market price is positive firms sell all that they produced ex ante, (iii) firms cannot 
increase their expected profits by producing more ex ante. 
When demand is certain, clearly prices are equal to marginal cost, so Proposition 
3 holds.  When demand is uncertain, we begin with the case where only one product is 
feasible. 
If only one product were feasible, say the high quality product, then when qh ≥ x 
the spot market price is zero and sales are x and when qh < x the spot market price is vh   15
and sales are qh.  Since the incremental profits from additional units of ex ante demand 
must be zero, qh is determined by 
ch = vh fx () dx
qh
∞ ∫ . 
It follows that 
vh 1− Fq h () [] − ch = 0.  
Now suppose that two products are feasible.  We begin by characterizing the 
equilibrium spot market prices and sales given qh and ql.   
When  x ≤ qh, the spot market price of high and low quality units will be zero and 
only high quality units will sell because all consumers strictly prefer high quality. The 
shadow cost of both high and low quality is zero.   
When qh < x ≤ ql + qh, the spot market price for low quality is zero and sales of 
low quality units are  x − ql. If the price were positive, then sales of the high quality units 
would be less than qh which implies the price of high quality units is zero, but since 
consumers strictly prefer high quality units, the demand for low quality units would be 
zero, which is inconsistent with a positive price for low quality units. It follows that the 
price of high quality units must be vh − vl and firms sell every unit produced  
When ql + qh < x, the spot market price for high quality units is vh and the spot 
market price for low quality units is vl and firms sell every unit produced. 
Since the incremental profits from additional units of ex ante production of low 
quality units must be zero, ql is determined by 
cl = vl fx () dx
qh +ql
∞ ∫ . 
And since the incremental profits from additional units of ex ante production of low 
quality units must be zero, ql is determined by 
ch = vh − vl () fx () dx
ql
qh +ql ∫ + vh fx () dx
qh +ql
∞ ∫ .   16
So 
vl 1− Fq h + ql () [] − cl ≤ 0, ql ≥ 0 
and 
vh 1− Fq h () [] − vl Fq h + ql () − Fq h () [] − ch ≤ 0, qh ≥ 0 
which implies Proposition 4 holds when markets are in equilibrium. 
3.2 Rigid Prices and Flexible Consumer Choice 
In this Section and Section 3.3, we assume that the firms set their prices before 
learning demand.  This assumption seems appropriate for some of the examples discussed 
in the introduction, such as restaurants.  Moreover price rigidities increase the likelihood 
that capacity is not utilized when demand realizations are low, and hence increase the 
likelihood that the use of quality dispersion will be the optimal policy to follow. We will 
see, however, that in the case of unit demands the equilibrium product variety is the same 
with and without price rigidities. 
In this Section, we assume that consumers can observe and costlessly choose 
among all available products and prices when they make their purchase decisions. 
Consumers make their purchases sequentially (they are identical so the order doesn’t 
matter) so this means that when it is a consumer’s turn to purchase, he or she is able to 
purchase the best remaining price-product combination offered by any firm. 
This zero shopping cost assumption is not always realistic.  Moreover, because of 
this assumption this model predicts only the market availability of products and not the 
product line of individual firms.  In equilibrium, all firms could be specialists in either 
high quality or low quality, or all could offer both high and low quality goods. We 
change this assumption in Section 3.3.   
This model is a multi-product extension of a model introduced by Prescott (1976), 
formalized by Eden (1990), and applied by Dana (2000).   17
In this environment a competitive equilibrium is a set of market prices, 
associated probabilities of sale, and ex ante quantity choices such that (i) firms cannot 
increase their profits by changing their ex ante output given the prices and associated 
probabilities of sale and (ii) the probability of sale associated with each price is consistent 
with prices, quantities, and market demand, (iii) consumers  
When demand is certain all firms charge marginal cost in equilibrium, so 
Proposition 3 holds.  When demand is uncertain, the competitive equilibrium will consist 
of a range of prices for each good offered. From profit maximization, i.e., the zero-profit 
condition, it follows that if a low quality good is offered at price p the probability that it 
sells in equilibrium must be cl p.  However firms may not offer positive output at all 
prices in equilibrium.  
In state x, goods with a probability of sale greater than or equal to 1− Fx ()  must 
















and prefer low quality goods otherwise.  When high quality goods are preferred, profit 
maximization implies that only high quality goods will be produced.  So when this 
expression holds at  x, i.e., vh − ch > vl − cl, the total supply of high quality goods will be 
the quantity that equalizes this expression:   18
vh −
ch
1− Fq h ()
= vl −
cl
1− Fq h ()
. 
In higher demand states, consumers prefer low quality goods, but only if the price is less 
than vl.  It follows that 
cl
1− Fq h + ql ()
= vl. 
This implies that (a) and (b) are satisfied, so Proposition 4 holds for rigid prices when 
consumers have flexible choice. 
3.3 Rigid Prices with Inflexible Choice 
In this section, consumers must commit to purchase from a single firm before they 
learn whether the firm’s products are available. Consumers choose given only ex ante 
information about firms’ products, prices, and inventories. If the firm that a consumer 
visits stocks out of a consumer’s preferred product, the consumer either buys another 
product from the same firm or nothing at all.  So consumers visit the firm that offers the 
greatest expect consumer surplus.  In equilibrium, competitive firms compete this surplus 
down to zero.    
A symmetric competitive equilibrium is a pair of prices and production levels 
and a set of active firms such that no combination of prices and production levels exists 
that would increase consumers’ surplus if every consumer switched to the deviating firm. 
This model is a multi-product extension of Carlton (1978)
1.  Since firms have no 
market power, the equilibrium prices and inventories are those that maximize consumer 
surplus plus producer surplus subject to a zero profit constraint and non-negative ex ante 
and ex post consumer surplus constraints.  In addition, if a firm offers both products it 
                                                 
1 See Deneckere and Peck (1995) for an analysis of this game with a finite number of 
firms.  They show that Carlton’s equilibrium is the limit of the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the oligopoly game as the number of firms goes to infinity.   19
must be the case that consumers buy high quality goods before they buy low quality 
goods.  If consumers behaved otherwise, the firm would be able to make a profitable 
deviation that would induce the efficient purchase order.   
So we can write the firm’s problem as
2 
max
ql ,qh,pl ,ph {}
vhxf x () dx
0
qh ∫ + vhqh + vl x − qh () [] fx () dx
qh
qh +ql ∫




− qhch − qlcl
 
subject to qh ≥ 0, ql ≥ 0, a zero profit constraint, 
phxf x () dx
0
qh ∫ + phqh + pl x − qh () [] fx () dx
qh
qh +ql ∫
+ phqh + plql [] fx () dx
qh +ql
∞
∫ − qhch − qlcl = 0,
 
ex post consumer surplus constraints: pl ≤ vl  and ph ≤ vh,  a purchase ordering constraint:  
vh − ph ≥ vl − pl,  and an ex ante consumer surplus constraint: 
vh − ph () gx () dx
0
qh ∫ +













where g is the probability distribution function for the demand state given that a random 
consumer actually wants the good. Note that the ex ante consumer surplus constraint is 
satisfied as long as the ex post constraints, pl ≤ vl and  ph ≤ vh, are satisfied, so it is not 
binding. Also, ph ≤ vh and vh − ph ≥ vl − pl imply  pl ≤ vl, so we can ignore this 
constraint.  
                                                 
2 Since f is distribution of aggregate demand and q denotes total output, the individual 
firm’s problem profit function is proportional to this aggregate profit function.   20
Consider the firm’s unconstrained production problem subject only to qh ≥ 0 and 
ql ≥ 0.  The complementary slackness conditions are  
vh − vl () Fq h + ql () − Fq h () [] + vh 1− Fq h + ql () [] − ch ≥ ,qh ≥ 0 (x) 
and 
vl 1− Fq h + ql () [] − cl ≥ 0,ql ≥ 0, (y) 
which imply that both (a) and (b) hold.  However we must verify that the omitted 
constraints are satisfied.  That is, we must verify that given (a) and (b) there exist prices 
such that ph ≤ vh, vh − ph ≥ vl − pl, and zero-profit constraint holds.  
It is natural to suppose the equilibrium prices will be the ones that equate the total 
revenues from sales of each product to the total costs of producing that product.  In this 
case the zero profit constraint holds by construction.  The price pl is defined by 
phxf x () dx
0
qh ∫ + phqh 1− Fq h () [] − qhch = 0,  
and the price  ph is defined by 
pl x − qh () fx () dx
qh
qh +ql ∫ + plql 1− Fq h + ql () [] − qlcl = 0.  

























 − cl = 0 (h) 
where the bracketed expressions are the average probability of sale of the high and low 
quality goods respectively.    21
From (a) and (b) we know  
vh 1− Fq h () [] − ch ≥ 0 





qh ∫ > 0, 
(g) implies that vh > ph whenever qh and ql are positive.   













And, since in each demand state the probability of sale of a high quality good is strictly 
greater than the probability of sale of a low quality good, it must be that the average 















and since vh ≥ vl, it follows that vh − ph > vl − pl. 
So all of the omitted constraints are satisfied by the solution (a), (b), (g) and (h) 
and Proposition 4 holds. 
However the equilibrium in this model does not yield unique individual prices. 
The prices defined by (g) and (h) are natural, but they are not unique.  The firms could 
also subsidize their low quality goods and charge a premium for high quality as long as 
its inventory satisfied (a) and (b) and vh − ph > vl − pl > 0. Prices only role here is to 
attract consumers to the store and there are many price pairs that induce the same   22
consumer behavior.  Furthermore, different firms can offer different prices in 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 5: All competitive equilibrium of the inflexible choice, rigid price model 
satisfy (a) and (b). 
While the prices pl and ph are not uniquely determined, they must be nonnegative, 
they must be less than vl and vh respectively, and they must induce consumers to weakly 
prefer the high quality item.    
4. The Two-Product Model with Downward Sloping Demand 
In this section we extend the two-product model by considering heterogeneity in 
consumers’ valuations.  This is particularly valuable because any empirical test of our 
theory of product variety will need to consider heterogeneous consumers. Also it is 
important to see that two-product models considered in Sections 2 and 3 will no longer 
yield the same equilibrium allocation when consumers are heterogeneous.  This is 
because both market power and ex ante pricing are contributing to the deadweight loss 
when consumers are heterogeneous.  Market power imposes costs for the usual reason.  
Ex ante pricing imposes costs because it is possible that consumers with the highest 
valuation of the good may find the good unavailable even while consumers with lower 
valuations were able to buy the good.  For this reason, we begin by characterizing the 
social planner’s problem and then show that this is the market allocation associated with 
market clearing prices. 
Let f denote the distribution of x, the number of identical consumers willing to 
pay v for the high quality good and v – s for the low quality good. Consumers know their 
own valuations conditional on wanting the good, but don’t learn whether or not they want 
the good until after the planner has chosen its inventory.   The distribution of consumer 
valuations in the population is given probability density function h and cumulative   23
density function H. Each consumer who wants a good will buy at most one. As before, 
high quality goods cost ch to produce whether or not they are used.  Low quality goods 
cost cl to produce whether or not they are used.  We assume that s> ch − cl, so given 
certain demand (e.g.,  x = x ) only the high quality product would be produced. 
We assume that x and v are independently distributed. In other words, an 
individual’s valuation is not correlated with the probability that they want the good.  This 
assumption implies that there is no role for screening in the product line decision of 
firms.  If screening were possibly, then it alone would offer a justification for product 
variety. 
If the social planner can produce only one good it would produce the high quality 




xv h v () dv
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∞ ∫ fx () dx
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∞ ∫ fx () dx
max qh,x ()
∞ ∫ − qhch. 
The first term characterizes consumer surplus when x consumers want the good 
and qh ≥ x are available.  In this case everyone gets the good and total surplus is  xE v [] .  
The second term characterizes consumer surplus when x consumers want the good and 
only qh < x are available.  In this case only consumers whose valuations are sufficiently 
high get the good.  The cutoff is the valuation of the marginal consumer in state x, which 
is defined by equating total consumption to the planner’s capacity: 
  qh = 1− Hv () [] x, 
or  





























































 fx () dx
max qh,x ()
∞
∫ = ch. (y) 
Let qh
* denote the solution to (y).  The social cost of capacity is set equal to the expected 
valuation of the marginal consumer (which is zero when the marginal consumer doesn’t 
exist).   
Note that the marginal consumer exists in every demand state if and only if 
qh
* ≤ x.  When qh
* > x then there exist low demand states in which everyone who wants 
the good has it, and there are no additional consumers available to derive utility from 
consuming the good. 
We now turn to the case where the planner can offer two goods.  Here the order of 
consumption may matter.  When all of the goods are consumed, efficiency requires that 
the consumers with the highest valuations obtain the good but it does not matter which 
consumers get the high quality good; each consumer values quality the same. However 
when demand is insufficient to fully utilize the available capacity, efficiency requires that 
the consumers with the highest valuations get the good and that all of the high quality 
goods be consumed before any of the low quality goods are consumed.   
Using this observation about the allocation of the goods ex post we can write the 
social planner’s problem as: 
max
qh,ql {}
xv h v () dv
0
∞ ∫ fx () dx
x
max qh,x () ∫ + xv h v () dv − x − qh () s
0
∞ ∫ [] fx () dx
max qh,x ()
max qh +ql ,x () ∫

















 fx () dx
max qh +ql ,x ()
∞ ∫ − qhch − qlcl
 
The first term characterizes consumer surplus when x consumers want the good 
and qh ≥ x are available.  In this case everyone gets the high quality good and total   25
surplus is  xE v [] .  The second term characterizes consumer surplus when x consumers 
want the good and only qh < x ≤ qh + ql are available.  In this case everyone gets a good, 
but  x − qh consumers get the low quality good. The third term characterizes consumer 
surplus when x consumers want the good and only qh + ql < x are available.  In this case 
only consumers whose valuations are sufficiently high get the good, and of those, ql 
consumers get the low quality good.  The marginal consumer in state x is defined by 
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∞
∫
+ sf x () dx
max qh,x ()
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∞











 fx () dx
max qh +ql ,x ()
∞











 fx () dx −
max qh +ql ,x ()
∞ ∫ s 1− F max qh + ql,x () () [] = cl.   26
The social cost of high quality capacity is set equal to the marginal consumer’s 
expected valuation for high quality, when the marginal consumer exists, plus the social 
value of switching a consumer from low quality to high quality when the marginal 
consumer does not exist but the high quality good is scarce.  The social cost of low 
quality capacity is set equal to the expected valuation of the marginal consumer for the 
low quality good. 
We can rewrite the complementary slackness conditions as 
Gq h + ql () + sFmax qh + ql,x () () − F max qh,x () () [] ≤ ch,qh ≥ 0 
and 
Gq h + ql () − s 1− F max qh + ql,x () () [] ≤ cl,ql ≥ 0. 
where 









 fx () dx
max z,x ()
∞ ∫ . 
is the zth consumer’s expected valuation for quality and since Gz () 1− F max qh,x () () []  is 
the probability the zth consumer exists, Gz () 1− F max z,x () () [ ] is the zth consumer’s 
expected valuation for quality conditional on there being z consumers. 
  Proposition 6 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for two products to be 
produced.    27
Proposition 6: If G x () ≤ cl, or if G x () > cl and  
cl
Gq h
* ()1− F max qh




* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () []
, 
then only the high quality good is produced.  If G x () > cl and  
cl
Gq h
* ()1− F max qh




* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () []
, 
then both good are produced. 
Proof: If Gx () ≤ cl, then the second complementary slackness condition implies 
that either ql = 0 or Gq h + ql () − s 1− F max qh + ql,x () () [] = cl ≥ Gx () .  The later 
implies qh + ql ≤ x since G is an increasing function.  So either ql = 0 or 
qh + ql ≤ x. Suppose ql = 0.  Then Gq h () ≤ ch so from the complementary 
slackness conditions it follows that qh > 0. Alternatively, suppose qh + ql ≤ x. 
Then F max qh + ql,x () () = F max qh,x () () = 0 and the complementary slackness 
conditions become 
Gq h + ql () ≤ ch,qh ≥ 0, 
and 
Gq h + ql () ≤ cl + s,ql ≥ 0. 
Since cl + s> ch, Gq h + ql () ≤ ch implies Gq h + ql () < cl, so ql = 0. Hence, if 
Gx () ≤ cl then only the high quality good is produced. 
  We now claim that if Gx () > cl and  
1− F max qh
*,x () () <
ch − cl
s
   28
then both goods are produced.  Suppose these conditions are true and only high 
quality goods are produced.   Then  
Gq h










 fx () dx
max qh
*,x ()
∞ ∫ = ch 
and from the complementary slackness conditions 
Gq h
* () − s 1− F max qh
*,x () () [] ≤ cl 
which implies 
ch − s 1− F max qh
*,x () () [] ≤ cl 
and equivalently  
1− F max qh




which is a contradiction.  So both goods are produced.   
 Note  that  Gq h
* () = ch implies 
1− F max qh
*,x () () [] =
ch
Gq h
* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () []
. 
So  
1− F max qh




cl < Gq h
* () − s 1− F max qh
*,x () () [ ] , 
cl < 1− F max qh
*,x () () []
Gq h
* ()
1− F max qh









  , 
cl
Gq h
* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () [] − s
< 1− F max qh




* ()1− F max qh




* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () []
 
are equivalent.  It follows that both goods are produced ifGx () > cl and  
cl
Gq h
* ()1− F max qh




* ()1− F max qh
*,x () () []
. 
Note that qh
* ≤ x is a necessary condition for production of the low quality good.  
If at the optimal single product production level, every unit of the high quality good 
produced is consumed in every demand state, then the low quality good will not be 
produced. Multiple product production is optimal when capacity (or inventory) is not 
always fully utilized.  Numerous classes of demand functions, such as isoelastic and 
Cobb-Douglas, have the property that demand approaches infinity as price goes to zero 
which implies  x =∞ .  In this case, it is clear that qh
* < x and production is always fully 
utilized so only one product would be produced.   
The necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social planner would 
choose to produce both high and low quality products are different from the conditions 
under which a monopolist or a competitive market with price rigidities (Sections 3.2 and 
3.3) would produce both products. For a monopolist this is clear because the decision 
depends on the preferences of the marginal consumers and the monopolist will clearly 
distort price and sell to fewer consumers.  Similarly, under two of the competitive models 
we analyze, prices are rigid and the resulting market distortions will impact the product 
line decision. In each of these models, price rigidities increase the likelihood that capacity 
is underutilized and hence increases the value of producing both products.  Under market 
clearing prices, the equilibrium product line decision will be the same as in Proposition 6.  
This is fairly easy to see since the competitive market with market clearing prices 
allocates the good in the same way that the social planner does.   30
5. Monopoly with Full Product Line 
In this section we generalize the two-product model by allowing the firm to offer 
a continuum of vertically differentiated product varieties. We consider explicitly only the 
monopolist’s decision, however generalizations of the other models are also feasible and 
based on the analysis of the monopoly case we briefly discuss the various competitive 
models and the complex forces that will drive product line decisions in those 
environments. 
As before, let  fx ()  denote the probability density function associated with the 
random variable x, the number of identical consumers willing to buy one unit of output 
(one good), on the support  x,x  [] ⊂ℜ
+ and suppose x > 0.  Let Fx ()  denote the 
associated cumulative distribution function. 
Let v denote consumers’ willingness to pay. Let cv ()  denote the cost of producing 
one unit of the product when quality is v.  We assume c 0 () = 0 and  ′  c  0 () <1. We also 
assume that there exists some v  such that v − cv () < 0 for all v >v .  Let 
v
* =argmax v − cv () () .  Clearly, 
Proposition 7: When demand is certain, the monopolist chooses product quality  ˜  v =v
*, 
produces q = x units, and sets its price equal to v
*.  
We now turn to the case where demand is uncertain. 
Single Product Monopolist   
Suppose that the firm is able to produce only one product. Which level of product 
quality would the firm choose?  The firm chooses its price, quantity, and quality to 
maximize profits.  Clearly the firm sets  ph = v , whether prices are set before or after 
demand is realized, so we can write the firm’s problem as 
max
v,q vxf x () dx
0
q
∫ + vqf x () dx
q
∞
∫ − qc v () . 
The first order conditions are   31
v 1− Fq () [] − cv ()=0. 
and  
xf x () dx
0
q
∫ + qf x () dx
q
∞
∫ − q ′  c v () =0 
Rewriting these expressions, the firm’s optimal inventory is given by  
1− Fq




and its optimal quality is given by 
′  c  ˜  v  () =
xf x () dx
0





This establishes the following two results: 
Proposition 8: When demand is uncertain and the firm is constrained to choose a single 
product variety, then the product quality chosen satisfies  ˜  v <v
*.    
Proposition 9: As the demand uncertainty increases, the monopolist’s choice of product 
quality,  ˜  v , falls. 
The Multi-Product Monopolist 
We now suppose that the monopolist can produce an arbitrary amount of each 
quality.  Without loss of generality (since the firm offers a continuum of product 
qualities), we assume it sets a uniform price for each quality.   
The following Lemma simplifies the statement of the firm’s optimization 
problem.  We show that the monopolist sets  pv ()=v  for all of the products it offers and 
that purchase decisions are ex post efficient.  Once again, this is very intuitive. Since 
these prices are feasible, the firm can easily induce consumers’ to make ex post efficient   32
purchasing decisions, and the firm captures the entire surplus, it is impossible for the 
monopolist to achieve any higher ex post profits. 
Lemma: Given its inventory, the monopolist sets  p v ()=v  for all of the products it 
produces, and in equilibrium consumers buy goods in decreasing order of quality 
(highest quality goods stock out first). 
Proof: If consumers strictly prefer some goods to others, then there must be at 
least one good whose price the firm can increase without affecting the order in 
which consumers make their purchases or the total volume of their purchases, and 
would therefore increase profits. Since this is a contradiction, consumers must be 
indifferent between all goods.  
If consumers are indifferent between the goods then clearly the price and 
quality ranking of the goods must be the same and it follows that consumers must 
buy the highest priced (highest quality) good first, and consume the goods in 
decreasing order of price.  If not, then by lowering the prices of all of its goods by 
a small, systematical different, amount, the firm could induce consumers to 
reorder there purchases in decreasing order of price which strictly increases the 
firm’s expected profit.  
The firm must set the price of its lowest quality units equal to consumers’ 
valuations since otherwise raising this price would have no impact on the volume 
or order of product sales and would strictly increase profits. And since consumers 
are indifferent between the goods, it follows that the prices for all products must 
equal consumers’ valuations. 
The firm’s problem is further simplified if we express the decision variable as the 
quality of each unit of the firm’s output rather than the amount of its output to offer at 
each quality level.  Define vx ()  to be the quality of the good purchased and consumed by   33
the marginal consumer when x consumers demand the good. So cvx () ()  is the ex ante 
cost of producing the marginal unit consumed in state x. It follows directly from the 
lemma that vx ()  is non-increasing in x, and therefore that cvx () ()  is non-decreasing in x. 
The firm’s problem is to choose its inventory and the product quality of each unit 
of its inventory.  Let Q denote the firm’s inventory which is clearly finite, so the firm 
chooses Q and vx ()  on  0,Q []  to maximize 
vx () 1− Fx () () dx − cvx () () dx
0
Q ∫ 0
Q ∫  (P) 
subject to the constraint that vx ()  is non-increasing.  
Proposition 10: When demand is uncertain, the optimal range of qualities for the firm is 
ˆ  v ,v
* [] . 
Proof: Suppose the constraint does not bind. Then it is clear that the firm’s 
optimization can be solved by point-wise maximization. The first order conditions 
are 
  ′  c v x () () =1− Fx ()  (*) 




=1− FQ () . (**) 
Equation (*) implies that v 0 () = v
* = argmax v − cv () () . Combining (*) and (**) 
yields 




So from the definition of  ˆ  v , 
  vQ () = ˆ  v = argmin
cv ()
v
.   34
Since,  ′ ′  c  > 0, and (*) implies 
  ′ ′  c v Q () () ′  v Q () =− fx () , 
it follows that vx ()  is strictly decreasing and the constraint is not binding.  So the 
optimal range of qualities is  ˆ  v ,v
* [] .  
The proposition establishes that the highest quality product that the firm produces 
is the product that would be offered if demand were certain. That is, the highest quality 
offered is the one that maximizes surplus (and the monopolist’s margin) conditional on 
sale.  The lowest quality offered is the one that maximizes the monopolist’s percentage 
markup. 
Note that the range of qualities is always finite, as long as cv
* () < v
*, because 
when the cost function is continuous there always exists a finite interval on which cv ()v  









As demand becomes more and more certain, the range of products offered 
remains the same.  This is empirically counterintuitive.  However, this model ignores the 
fixed costs associated with product variety.  While the optimal product variety is 
independent of the demand uncertainty, the benefits of product variety diminish as 
demand becomes more certain.  So if fixed costs of product variety were included in the 
model, then variety would diminish.  
For brevity we do not replicate these results for the three competitive models 
discussed in Section 3.  However it is clear that the monopolist is once again extracting 
the entire consumer surplus, so the monopoly outcome, social planner outcome, and the 
market clearing price outcome are clearly the same. Because consumers have   35
homogeneous valuations, the other two competitive models also yield the same market 
allocation. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that demand uncertainty is an explanation for vertical product 
differentiation even when consumers have ex post identical tastes. Demand uncertainty 
makes it possible that not all inventory or capacity is utilized, and as a consequence, 
firms find it optimal to respond to sell low cost, low quality products in addition to high 
cost, high quality ones. In practice underutilization of inventory is much more likely 
when firms prices are rigid.  Therefore, all else equal, we expect that we see a greater 
range of product qualities in such cases.   
Future work should consider product line choice when the manufacturer and the 
retailer are different firms.  In this case, a monopoly manufacturer of a high quality good 
can choose to extract rents from his retailer either directly through a higher price, or 
indirectly by being the sole supplier of the low quality good and earning an additional 
margin when a low quality sale is made.  This second approach is likely to be more 
efficient than the first, because it avoids a marginal price distortion.  This suggests that 
simple extensions of our model will provide an explanation for manufacturers’ use of 
full-line forcing. 
We believe that this work should have a direct impact on the empirical literature 
on product differentiation and price discrimination.  Our model predicts higher absolute 
markups and lower percentage markups for high quality products in both competitive and 
monopoly markets, even when consumers have ex post identical preferences for product 
quality.  The model is empirically relevant for any market in which consumer substitute 
between high and low quality, market demand is uncertain, and market clearing spot 
prices do not guarantee that firms’ inventory or capacity is fully utilized.    36
Empirical testing of the model would require careful attention to the measurement 
of margins, turnover, shelf space restrictions, competitive conditions in retailing and 
manufacturing, and the use of full line forcing, as well as to the existence of customers 
with different relative valuations over quality.  Perhaps the most direct existing studies 
relevant to our model involve a study of grocery stores, which, for a wide variety of 
products, stock both high quality national brands and low quality private labels.  The 
evidence seems to support our model’s main predictions. For a wide variety of products 
(e.g., tooth brushes, toothpaste, soft drinks, crackers, soups, cereals, etc) grocery stores 
earn a higher percentage margins on private labels than on national brands, while the 
absolute margin (especially after adjusting for turnover) is generally higher on the 
national brands.
3  But these studies should be viewed as only suggestive of the model’s 
applicability, and more carefully designed studies across a variety of different industries 
would be necessary to full test the applicability of the model’s predictions. 
 
 
                                                 
3 See Barsky, et. al. (2001), Hock and Banjier (1993), Ailawadi (2002), Salman and 
Cmar, 1987, Supermarket Strategic Alert (2002), Brady et. al. (2003), Berges-Sennou et. 
al. (2003).   37
7. References 
Ailawadi, Kusum, and Bari Harlam, 2002, “The Effect of Store Brands on Retailer 
Profitability: An Empirical Analysis,” Working Paper 02-06, Tuck School of 
Business at Dartmouth. 
Barsky, Robert, Mark Bergen, Shantanu Dutta, and Deniel Levy, 2001, “What can the 
Price Gap Between Branded and Private Label Products Tell us about Markups?,” 
NBER Working Paper 8426, August. 
Bassok, Yehuda, Ravi Anupindi, Ram Akella, 1999, “Single-Period Multi-product 
Inventory Models With Substitution,” Operations Research, Volume: 47. July-
August 1999, Number: 4. pp. 0632-0642. 
Berges-Sennou, Fabian, Philippe Bontems, and Vincent Requillart, 2003, “Economic 
Impact of the Development of Private Labels,” Conference of the Food System 
Research Group, University of Wisconsin, Madison, June. 
Brady, Lucy, Aaron Brown, and Barbara Hulit, (2003) “Private Label: Threat to 
Manufacturers, Opportunity for Retailers,” available at BetterManagement.com. 
Carlton, Dennis W., (1978), “Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price 
Inflexibility,” American Economic Review, September, 68, pp. 571-587. 
Dana, James D.  "Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive 
Markets" Journal of Political Economy, Vol.106, Number 2, April 1998, 395-422.  
Dana, James, “Equilibrium Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty: The Roles of 
Costly Capacity and Market Structure,” RAND Journal of Economics, 2000. 
Deneckere and Peck ‘‘Competition over Price and Service Rate when Demand Is 
Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis.’’ RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1995), 
pp. 148–161.  
Eaton and Lipsey, “Product Differentiation,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, 
Vol. 1, North-Holland, 1989. 
Eden, Benjamin, “Seemingly Rigid Prices,” The University of Haifa, April 2002. 
Eden, Benjamin (1990), “Marginal Cost Pricing When Spot Markets Are Complete,” The 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6. (Dec., 1990), pp. 1293-1306.  
Hoch, Stephen, and Sumeet Banerji, 1993, “When Do Private Labels Succeed?,” Sloan 
Management Review, Summer, pp. 57-77. 
Lancaster, Kevin, 1990, “The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey”, Marketing 
Science, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer, 189-206.   38
Mahajan and van Ryzin (1998) “Stocking Retail Assortment under Dynamic Consumer 
Substitution,” Operations Research, 49(3), May-June, pp. 334-351. 
Mussa, Michael and Sherwin Rosen, 1978, “Monopoly and Product Quality,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 18, pp. 301-317. 
Prescott (1975), “Efficiency of the Natural Rate,” Journal-of-Political-Economy, 
December, pp. 1229-1235. 
Salmon, Walter J, and Karen Cmar, 1987, “Private Labels Are Back in Fashion,” 
Harvard Business Review, May/June, p. 99. 
Shepard, Andrea, “Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,” Journal-of-Political-
Economy, 99(1), February 1991, pages 30-53.    
Smith and Agrawal, (2000), “Management on Multi-item retail inventory systems with 
demand substitution,” Operations Research, 48, pp. 50-64. 
“Supermarket Strategic Alert Special Report 2002, Branding and Private Labels,” Pollack 
Associates, 2002, 
van Ryzin and Mahajan, (1999), “On the relationship between inventory costs and variety 
benefits in retail assortments,” Management Science, 45, pp. 1496-1509. 
 
 